Amjad Ismail Agha
The Ukrainian crisis hastily raided the intertwined files between Russia and the United States, specifically in the Middle East, and regardless of the controversial reasons that prompted Russia to launch its military operation in Ukraine, and away from the results and developments of the conflict between the Russian and Ukrainian parties, there are clear repercussions and effects on the The files of Middle Eastern interaction, between the Russian and American sides, especially since most of the files between them are used and invested as tools for pressure, in order to reachwhat can be called “geopolitical swaps”.
The Syrian file and its scattered papers among the regional and international powers are among the files that concern Moscow and Washington alike. The Syrian file still suffers from the absence of a specific international framework for a political settlement, which keeps the Syrian file in all its parts, as a hostage within the maps of influence and interests drawn by the active and influential forces in the Syrian geography. On the other hand, theSyrian scene, implicitly settled at The point of implicit acceptance of the current reality, with the balance of power and interests equations remaining a constant option, which has put the Syrian file in a state of stagnation, with the maps of military influence remaining without any changes.
Syria, which announced its support for Russia in its military operation in Ukraine, and this support preceded the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, visiting the Russian Hmeimim military base in Latakia, and his meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before the Russian military operation in Ukraine, which observers considered, that Syria has become an “extension of Russian national security”, especially since the Hmeimim base is considered the Russian advanced line of defense in the Mediterranean to confront NATO, which has a strong presence at Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, one of the most important members of the alliance.
As a logical result linked to the course of the Russian war in Ukraine, Moscow’s interest in the Syrian file has become framed by a relative decline, especially at the military level. This decline was reflected in a noticeable decrease in the activity of Russian forces in many Syrian regions. Although this decline does not reflect an actual change in Russia’s management of all dimensions of the crisis, as it still controls all its effects on the ground, it is served by the nature of American interests under the Biden administration towards the hotbeds of armed conflicts; Where this administration pays qualitative attention to some of the sub-tracks within the Syrian file; such as the file of humanitarian aid, combating terrorism, and ensuring Israel’s security in the face of the dangers posed by Iran’s presence in the south of Syria, which gives Russia a large margin of maneuver in dealing with the Syrian conflict; Whether at the level of the stalled political negotiation tracks, or at the level of military movements on the ground.
The part related to the state of Russian-American interaction in the Syrian file is related to the escalating tension between the two parties regarding the Ukrainian file, as it seems clear that this interaction will witness shifts in the modularity of dealing, to move from the state of “tacit consensus” that was represented in accepting the “Syrian/Syrian” negotiation path. Regarding the Constitutional Committee under Russian auspices, as a path stemming from UN Resolution No. 2254, to a state of “severe militancy” that will have negative repercussions on the Syrian Kurdish allies of the United States in the Autonomous Administration areas in northern Syria, specifically the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are backed by Washington militarily and logistically, in addition to the strong possibility that Russia will exert pressure towards the US military presence in northern Syria, which increases pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces, and makes them without military or political cover in the face of the Syrian regime.
In addition to the above, the repercussions of the Russian war in Ukraine have also received a changing Turkish attitude, especially since Turkey, which is militarily involved in Syria, puts developments in Ukraine within its geopolitical perspective. Ankara has identified with European-American policies, and Turkey has closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles passages to Russian military ships, which is a qualitative development in the Turkish position on the Russian military operation in Ukraine, which indicates the occurrence of severe and negative repercussions on Russian-Turkish relations in the long run.
The previous Turkish position was reinforced by two goals. The first is for European countries to appreciate the Turkish position, prompting them to show a degree of flexibility towards Ankara’s continued demands to join the European Union. The second is Ankara’s desire to influence the US position in support of the Kurdish-Syrian Democratic Forces “SDF”, prompting Washington to take into account Turkey’s security fears of the presence of an armed Kurdish entity on its southern borders.
Among the variables that accompanied the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Israeli variable emerged. The state of extreme caution shown by Naftali Bennett’s government, and perhaps tacit support in favor of the Russian invasion, was motivated by Tel Aviv’s fears that Moscow would restrict Israel’s continuous military strikes against Iranian and Syrian targets, deep in Syria.
Within the foregoing, it has become clear that the Syrian card has become hampered by many problems, and in parallel, there are indications that the Ukrainian crisis will enter the same path that the Syrian crisis has entered, which is that both crises have become hotbeds of conflict that attract foreign fighters, in a way that means opening new hotbeds of terrorism. At the international level on the one hand, and in the heart of Europe on the other hand, and linking the Ukrainian crisis to the changes in the relationship between Russia and the United States and European countries in the Middle East files on the third hand.
Finally. It is clear that the file of the Syrian crisis has been linked to a wide range of international conflicts between Russia and the United States as well as Europe, and on top of these conflicts, the Russian military operation in Ukraine, and in connection with this, Damascus hopes that this conflict will end, with a Russian victory on the ground, and a political victory over The United States and Europe, which may reflect positively on Russia’s vision of a political solution in Syria, and in line with the goals of the Syrian state, and until then, the Syrian file will remain in a state of flux, governed by a state of consensus and understandings, between Russia, the United States and Turkey, noting that the future of this Consensus and understandings will remain subject to the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and the extent to which Russia and the United States are able to isolate the paths of their interactions from each other. Either in Europe or the Middle East.
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