Amjad Ismail Agha
Some believe that the law of war is not different from the law of resorting to war, but in fact, this belief is wrong, as under international law, there are two ways to look at war, which are the reasons for fighting first, and how to fight second, and contemporary international law distinguishes between the reasons that authorizes resort to war, and the legal regime governing any armed conflict. This leads to the fact that, whatever the fairness of the purpose that motivates the war, the warring parties are treated on the principle of equality, in terms of the rules regulating armed conflict, without discrimination between any of the parties, whether the aggressor or the aggressor. In the same context, the law of resorting to war defines the legitimate reasons for the state to wage a war, and at the same time, is based on certain criteria that try to make the war just, so to speak.
According to international law, war may not be waged except in three cases, the first being legitimate self-defense, and the second authorizing the use of force by the Security Council, in the event of a threat or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and this is what falls under the love clause Chapter VII and III The use of force by the national liberation movements.
The foregoing is necessary to place the Russian war on Ukraine within the frameworks of international law, to approach that war, and to place it in the context of the Russian perspective. In Russian national security, Ukraine represents a geopolitical value with tight controls; They are controls that Russia has translated as a threat to Russian national security, and it must be framed and political mines removed in Russia’s neighboring country. Certainly, the Russian army has plans and scenarios in multiple contexts, governing the Russian operation in Ukraine, and it does not seem logical, that there are no The Russian army has perceptions of Ukraine with its terrain and demographics, and maps of its infrastructure distribution, in addition to Russian readings related to the outcomes and repercussions of the war, in its political, military and economic aspects.
All of this confirms that the decision of the Russian military operation in Ukraine was not a decision taken hastily. At the very least, it can be said that there is a hidden intention of the Russian forces to start a war on Ukraine; But there are questions about the reasons that prompted the Russian leadership to take the decision to war, despite all the Russian statements that refuted Western and American allegations regarding the Russian intention to invade Ukraine, which was framed by controversial and confusing theories, particularly among observers and analysts closest to decision-making centers. Russian.
The hypothesis of the Russian stumble in Ukraine may seem based, in large part, on Western and American propaganda, in order to prevent the Ukrainians from surrendering, despite the military strength of the Russian army. Ukrainian centers of power and neutralization. While Putin seeks to frame the military intervention ostensibly as self-defense, the Kremlin has stated that Russia needs to ensure that Ukraine is prevented from posing a continuing threat to Russia and its people. Ukraine, as a threat to Russian national security, despite the ongoing clashes in Donbass since 201, which indicates that Russia-Putin has special goals for the military operation on Ukraine, amounting to achieving territorial gains, and strategic ambitions beyond the countries of the former Soviet Union .
It is likely that Putin, realizing that he is running out of time to consolidate his legacy as the greatest leader in Russia’s history, has never hidden his admiration for the former glory of the Soviet Union, and the influence exercised by that former superpower, which is confirmed by Russian steps, towards returning Russia to its rightful position on the stage. Global. Russia has taken concrete steps to advance its rise to great power status by expanding its territorial borders in Europe, first after the conflict in Crimea in 2014, and then after the disputed elections in Belarus in 2020.
Putin has long challenged Ukraine’s legitimacy as a state, and the sovereignty that was granted to it upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, so Putin seeks to place Ukraine as a land and people, as part of an expanded union within the state of the Russian Federation, and according to Putin’s theory, this will effectively ensure Russia’s ability to restore Delimiting its European borders, to where it was originally located at the height of the Soviet Union’s glory, and at a more distant goal, would not only frustrate the further eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO, which represents the real threat to Russia’s security, but would also allow Putin to undo what he considers to be Some Russians are a historical injustice.
As such, many analysts speculate, that the ultimate goal of the special military operation is to return Ukraine to Russia by removing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and forming a new government that cooperates with Russia. But in a part that may change the Russian balance regarding the objectives of the military operation in Ukraine, the Russian army did not expect the Ukrainian forces to hold out to this extent, including, it is unlikely that Russia will succeed in bringing about a change in the regime in Kyiv, without a dramatic escalation of violence Which would certainly not make the average Ukrainian more sympathetic to Russia, and thus Putin will need to find the right balance.
In conclusion, and within the hypothesis of Russian stumbling in Ukraine, it can be considered that Russia’s borders will inevitably be redrawn after the military intervention in Ukraine, and that parts of what is currently known as modern Ukraine will reside within those new borders, as it seems likely that Putin will seek to restore the Russian situation to what he indicated to “historically Russian lands” in New Russia, thereby creating a much-needed land bridge in Crimea.
All this is a Russian circumvention of the hypothesis of stumbling in Ukraine, and framing the West’s attempts in terms of preventing Russia from achieving a number of its goals from the special military operation, in addition to that, and within a further goal, will allow Putin to prove that his intention was never to occupy Ukraine, or to eliminate On the concept of the Ukrainian nation, the western part of the country could remain outside the control of the Kremlin.
Accordingly, the foregoing explains the Russian strategy of advancing the Russian forces at an icy pace in Ukraine, in contrast to the Russian military force, which if put in its true course, Ukraine will not be able to withstand, in the face of Russian force.