The “New Iranian Discourse”… Fears of Isolation and Challenges of Integration.

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Amjad Ismail Al-Agha \ Writer and political researcher

New titles and balances that define the boundaries of Middle Eastern roles. This was a clear translation of the state of political and diplomatic movement that the region witnessed during the past months. It is a movement that some have put in the framework of extrapolating the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which revealed the existence of serious equations to draw the features of the next stage, in line with the expectations and actors of that war, which will draw “perhaps” the boundaries of the roles of the Middle Eastern powers. Between this and that, the Saudi-Iranian agreement, which came under Chinese auspices, opened the appetite of observers to search for the dimensions and repercussions of this agreement, in terms of the role it plays in drawing up and arranging political files in the region, as well as the challenges inherent in the Middle East, vis-à-vis the international powers concerned with this region. Which constitutes an important and essential link in the system of its economic, political and strategic interests.

In this sense, the agreement is undoubtedly an important and pivotal point in the region’s dynamics and developments. At the same time, the nature of the agreement and its contents will give Iran a margin of maneuver, in order to rearrange its cards in the region, and initiate steps that will reactivate dialogue and neighborhood diplomacy, to take advantage of the positive atmosphere in the region and the state of regional détente, according to which Tehran will be able to communicate with Iran. The West first, and strengthening its regional partnerships second, all of this means that Tehran has laid the first building block in the way of achieving what it was aspiring for, in terms of regional acceptance and international recognition of it, as a regional power, which has many actors and influences in the region’s files.

However, the body of the Saudi-Iranian agreement and its main headlines explicitly stipulated respect for the sovereignty of the countries of the region, non-interference in the affairs of other countries, and most importantly, the cessation of security and military interventions, and influencing the decisions of the countries of the region. On the other hand, the existing political relations between states on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of each state leave room for a kind of political intervention that takes into account in these relations the national and strategic interests of each state, provided that these policies do not constitute a threat to the strategic interests of the other state, especially if It was not a neighboring country or constituted a vital geostrategic area for it.

Within political realism, it is undeniable the nature and quality of Iranian discourse, which included goals and ideas related to attempts to influence, dominate, and impose influence, especially since Tehran views itself as a regional power that owns and possesses tools of influence, and seeks to employ those tools to achieve the ambition of hegemony, but in On the other hand, the Saudi-Iranian agreement established respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their affairs as a fundamental pillar for starting a new path based on calm and strengthening the requirements for stability in the region, which has been exhausted by political, military and even economic tensions.

In the same context, and within the concerns of Iranian isolation, and linked to the concepts of political power, aimed at strengthening its regional position, Tehran has worked for decades to invest in building military and political forces and factions that work with it and implement its policies, in addition to relying on equations to enhance and consolidate its influence in the region.

It was clear that Iran was obsessed with the policies of some countries in the region, which aligned with Iranian interests, and it would not be difficult, in this context, to infer this matter, by delving deeper into the regional arenas, extending from Yemen through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, all the way to Palestine, and others. One of the countries that fall within the framework of the strategic and geostrategic vision of Iran along the West Asia and the Caucasus.

After the agreement between Tehran and Riyadh, it seems that the new Iranian discourse may “perhaps” abide by the contents of this agreement, which is supposed to open a new path for Tehran in terms of dealing with the countries of the region and their spheres of influence in the region, specifically the Arab countries. However, within the challenges of integration, the new path facing Tehran does not necessarily mean that it abandons the style of its Middle Eastern policies, nor does it mean that Tehran will abandon the support of its groups, which paved the way for establishing Iran as an influential player and heavyweight in the regional equations, and gave it the ability to be present in international politics. However, it is expected that Iran will adopt a different behavior that does not harm its new interests and does not threaten its political investments.

In the same context, the groups supported by Iran in the region will also have to adhere to the new Iranian discourse, conform in substance and content to Iran’s political approach, and move to coexist with the terms and titles of the Saudi-Iranian agreement, and the equations that it will produce or impose on the regional arena, and move from a state of Rivalry and conflict, to the state of cooperation and dialogue and taking into account the interests of all parties.

In reality, Tehran may be able, within the two parts of the concerns of isolation and the challenges of integration, to abide by the implementation of the provisions of the Saudi-Iranian agreement, but there are questions related to Saudi Arabia, and the possibility of its exit from the American mantle, and to some extent, its exit from the language of dictates, especially since the new Saudi arrangements may collide with equations Iranian influence, in addition to Saudi Arabia’s desire to acquire the active and influential regional seat in most files, and there are groups, arms and forces between Tehran and Riyadh that are able to obstruct new directions, especially since the titles of imposing control and influence are politically attractive titles, and they have great effects.

From the foregoing, it seems clear that Iran is working to make the most of the context of regional détente in the region, to enhance the diplomacy of an active and influential presence, to strengthen its regional legitimacy, and to benefit economically from cooperation with the countries of the region. It also aims, on the other hand, to lift sanctions and enhance its economic integration at the international level. And politically. But the fundamental question remains, will Iran provide reassurances by changing its regional behavior to continue obtaining these gains?

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