Amjad Ismail Al , Agha
From a different perspective, regional powers are close, with President Joe Biden’s visit to the Middle East, in accordance with strategic determinants that intersect with the interlocking issues across the region, but at the same time seek to anticipate the outcome of Biden’s visit and put it in the strategic balance governing its regional interests. In connection with this, what is clear so far, and what might be called the most prominent title of Biden’s visit to the region, is the increased rapprochement with the Arab alliance, with the aim of encouraging them to intensify oil and gas production and continue to align themselves with Washington, while deepening the concepts of the Ibrahimi Agreement. But within that, Iran has concerns based on the vocabulary of U.S.-Gulf rapprochement in general, and, in particular, U.S.-Saudi rapprochement, as a result, Iran is struggling to lay the foundations for new U.S. alliances, relying on a number of factors influencing its regional policy.
According to The Iranian perspective, the rapprochement between Washington and the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, depends not only on the limitations of its objectives, the leadership in Iran sees any U.S.-Saudi rapprochement as a challenge to Iranian strategies in general in the region, especially since Iran considered, on the basis of a number of political steps, whether American or Gulf, that its regional policies have succeeded. In other words, Iran saw the return of the United States to the negotiating table in Vienna and elsewhere, and the growing influence of the Iranian lobby in Washington, since the return of Barack Obama’s policy to the White House; New, this rings the alarm in Tehran, and warns of new regional blocs, against Iranian targets in the region.
Iran realizes that the return of warmth to U.S.-Saudi relations, will reopen the door of U.S. arming saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and, in parallel, Israel, in addition, will be the nucleus of military cooperation between the former countries, and an Israeli military umbrella that will expand into the Gulf states, which means shaking iran’s strategic balance, with the west coast of the Gulf, in addition, Iran is afraid to strengthen U.S. strategic interests with the Gulf states and Israel, which Tehran puts in the context of weakening its interests, and the effects of that On the nuclear deal.
Among the above, the success of the U.S.-Gulf rapprochement, from the Iranian point of view, is the loss of the advantages of power in Iran’s papers in the region, and based on this approach, Iran may resort to a number of steps, to undermine the effects of any new U.S.-Gulf rapprochement. As a result, Iran will seek to provoke a crisis at home, relying on the team supporting the completion of the nuclear deal and completing its steps, as well as inciting the American media already opposed to the Arab alliance and Israel. Since the Biden administration began moving toward Saudi Arabia and Israel, a campaign of skepticism has begun in the pro-nuclear press, which has led criticism campaigns against saudi, Emirati, Egyptian, and former Netanyahu leaders. Current media criticisms across the New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN focus on president Biden not “fulfilling” his election promises to “punish” Saudi Arabia, and pressure Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain, all under the slogan of “protecting human rights.” This pressure has already begun, even on low fire, because any escalation between the Iranian lobby and the White House could weaken the Democratic party camp in the upcoming congressional elections.
In the same vein, among Iran’s strategies to torpedo any U.S.-Gulf rapprochement, Iran may seek to move its factions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, to sow fear of a partial collapse of stability in the region, which could prompt Washington to reverse its new policies toward rapprochement with the Gulf.
In the same vein, Iran, within its strategic perspective, may work to open dramatically toward Russia and China, with the possibility that the Iranian leadership, by opening the atmosphere, territories and coasts of Iran, fully to the nuclear powers Russia and China, in the sense of moving to a higher degree of firm alliance with Moscow and Beijing, which could be placed, within the stages of the overthrow of the nuclear deal, and break the economic blockade by joining the “Asian bloc” economically and militarily, which will cause political confrontation within America and Europe, which the West is not ready Him.
In other words, there is no doubt that Iran has gold papers, with strategic investments, and as a result, Tehran may resort to activating multiple parts of the various possibilities, gradually pressuring the Biden administration, not to choose the alliance instead of the deal. It’s like a chess game that Tehran has mastered, but the iranian-facing sides have mastered chess as well, and nothing is guaranteed for anyone this summer in the Middle East.
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