Conflict of agendas in eastern Syria .. Ain Issa as a model.

italiatelegraph

Amjad Ismail Al-Agha

A set of scenarios intersect on the fate of the eastern Euphrates; All the data, with its agendas and challenges, indicate that the military option card will not be revised in favor of political understandings between the parties to the conflict. In addition to the above, the course of the facts confirms that all parties are preparing to prepare for the worst scenario in the Ain Issa region, especially as the interconnectedness of the geographical facts in eastern Syria, and the emerging political challenges linked to military dimensions, all this confirms that the parties to the conflict are motivated to start a round of fighting that may open By initiating new political titles, with the horizon of solutions that satisfy Damascus, Moscow and Ankara being blocked, as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces, which are still resisting pressure and swimming against the current, ignoring the recommendations of many American politicians when they noted that the friendship of the United States and the bet on its continued support means death. The investigator, and at the same time, the SDF is still taking the ABCs of imposing influence as a basis for its direction, so that Damascus’s demands for the return of the Kurds to their Syria remain without a clear response.

The circumstances of the scene in Ain Issa, eastern Syria, confirms that there is a state of negotiating and military rams that affect most of the active and influential forces. This stems from the importance of the geography of eastern Syria for all the players involved in the Syrian crisis; The influence in this region is now calculated in meters. And between Russia, which aspires to achieve a breakthrough in a region of an important economic and strategic stature, Turkey, which aspires to strengthen its influence and actually implement its expansion vision, and the United States of America, which considers eastern Syria regions of a ruling and articulated nature in managing its policies towards the Syrian file; Ain Issa is an important site in the players’ strategies, given the economic and political temptations to control it.

In this sense, Ain Issa is of strategic importance due to its proximity to the M4 international road It connects the governorates of Hasaka, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor to the east with the city of Aleppo in the north, as well as through a main road network east of the Euphrates to the west, and gives the party that controls it militarily the ability to control the means of transportation and logistical supply between the areas of Ain al-Arab and Manbij in the eastern countryside of Aleppo. And in the regions of the Syrian island and the cities of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.

On a parallel side, the excuses being promoted by most of the parties explains the size of the challenges and threats that frame the scene in eastern Syria, as Turkey accuses the SDF of launching from Ain Issa to carry out “terrorist” operations with the aim of destabilizing the “Peace Spring” areas and allowing Hezbollah forces Kurdistan workers, using Ain Issa to threaten Turkish national security, and demanding the withdrawal of the “SDF” forces from the city.

On the other hand, the SDF refuses to withdraw from Ain Issa on the grounds that the region is outside the areas that were agreed upon between Turkey and Russia in the agreement signed between them in Sochi, and Russia demands that it fulfill its obligations and prevent the Turks from invading the region, while Russia rejects the Kurdish demands and stipulates handing over Ain Issa of the Syrian state, which the SDF has refused until now, and demands the application of the model that was applied in “Manbij” and “Tal Rifaat,” where there are points for the Syrian and Russian forces at the entrances to the two cities, but Russia rejects this model, and demands the “Qasd” To hand over Ain Issa to the Syrian state.

In the same context, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had reached an agreement with the “SDF” to withdraw from Ain Issa and hand it over to the Syrian army and Russian forces in agreement with the Turkish side, in order to preserve the stability of the region. However, the “SDF” denied reaching such an agreement, confirming The continuation of the map of control in Ain Issa and its environs as it is.

Of course, what is understood by the Syrian and Russian moves politically and militarily towards Ain Issa comes within the framework of a number of goals, which can be summarized as follows:

First – The main goal is based on deterring Turkey and violating its soft strategy, especially since Turkey does not hide its agenda regarding expanding its areas of influence in eastern Syria, and striking any Kurdish attempts to establish a Kurdish entity near the Turkish borders, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the United States with the problems of transfer of power.

Second – Strengthening the Syrian presence in a way that establishes a scene that will affect the rest of the eastern Euphrates regions, with the emergence of partial work with a tight strategy for a possible confrontation with the American forces, especially since Joe Biden did not disclose the truth of his policies towards Syria in general and its east in particular, which translates the American position regarding developments Ain Issa, which the US administration considers as interim developments that will be dealt with, and not a strategy that could affect the context of US strategies in Syria.

This position was reinforced by the fact that there were no American forces in Ain Issa and its surroundings. In addition, the visit of the commander of American forces in the Middle East, Frank Mackenzie, to Hasakah, and his meeting with the commander of the “SDF” Mazloum Abdi “, sheds some light on American policies. The visit carries a message from Washington to the SDF to stop talks with Russia and the Syrian state, because it contradicts Washington’s policy and the way it moves in the Syrian file.

In the end, the SDF is facing complicated facts; The United States is preoccupied with the process of transferring power from one administration to another, which placed it between the jaws of Turkey and Russia, which are seeking to change the situation in the areas east of the Euphrates, in order to strengthen their positions in Syria in anticipation of the arrival of the Biden administration, as they feel the possibility of a tightening of the American position towards them in the Syrian file, and thus The “SDF” has difficult options, which are limited to waging an uncertain confrontation with Turkey and the terrorist factions that support it, or handing over Ain Issa to Russia and the Syrian state, and the effect of this in both cases on its positions of influence in Ayn al-Arab and Manbij. As a result, the SDF is trying to prolong the negotiations with the Russian side as far as possible, and keep the lines of fire outside the city until it reaches a deal that prevents the Turkish factions and army from attacking them.

Accordingly, the complications around Ain Issa are part of a complex and complex landscape that affects the entire northeast of Syria, especially since the multitude of players involved in the crisis makes the situation that these parties face in determining the future of the eastern Euphrates regions, and so far none has been able to These parties involved in the conflict from changing the status quo in that region in favor of any of them, and perhaps this is what makes the situation likely to remain as they are until the image of the new US administration’s policy towards the region becomes clear, without canceling the possibility of a military adventure by Russia and the Syrian state, Especially in the absence of an explicit and declared American policy regarding Ain Issa.

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