Idlib … the limits of confrontation and scenarios for the Turkish challenge

italiatelegraph

Amjad Ismail Al-Agha

The “bitter fruits” are what the President of the Turkish regime Recep Tayyip Erdogan will gain as a result of his policies in Syria, as all data indicate that there is an imminent war that will topple Erdogan’s options in Idlib, especially as he has exhausted all the opportunities presented to him, which came as an extension of the Astana track and the Sochi understandings, with hand That Erdogan does not want good through the recent moves, which were on the basis of pressure in the Syrian field militarily to seize a wide range of political gains; This comes after he gained strength in Libya, but until now Erdogan has not realized that there are political and military bases in Syria that differ in essence and content from Libya, and any new adventure in Syria will have repercussions and echoes not only in Syria, but its frequency will reach Libya, especially since His political and military options in Syria have been reduced to their minimum

Amidst the struggles of wills in the field of Idlib, Erdogan realizes that the Syrian state has a surplus of power, which enables it to go far towards a broad military action, whereby Idlib is liberated from all regional and international equations, specifically those that regulate the Turkish agenda throughout northern Syria, and Russia And based on the military concept based on the necessities of eliminating terrorism, it will not exaggerate its strategic interests with Damascus, regardless of the data of the Russian-Turkish relationship, which is governed by geostrategic factors, especially since Moscow realizes that the Atlantic air is what feeds Erdogan’s regional and international ambitions, and therefore the Damascus equation Moscow is proceeding according to the will of power and the use of data to achieve the goals; This equation caused confusion and confusion in the political mentality with which Erdogan deals with the course of events in Syria, which translated political statements but within the framework of threats and threats, with the help of his NATO allies, and the use of the refugee card to politically pressure Europe and lure its sympathy.

Erdogan’s attempts did not find an echo with Washington and the leaders of the European Union, and with the failure to implement his pledges in Idlib, the curtain will fall on his series of evasions, and the result will be two options that are not three:

First – Going far towards sliding further into the Syrian quagmire, and becoming a direct confrontation with the Syrian army, without accounting for the difference in political and military burdens that will put it face to face with the allies of Damascus.

Second – To comply with and implement the terms of the agreement that he signed with his Russian counterpart, which is an extension of the Sochi agreement, and the judge in one of its clauses is that the Turkish side and its army commit to eliminating the terrorist factions that it sponsors that are spread in some cities and towns of Idlib and its countryside and operate under a cover of it.

Between the two options, there is a dilemma that Erdogan himself engineered, as events began to take a different turn in a way that contradicts his calculations. When Erdogan pushed his soldiers and military vehicles in and around Idlib, he did not realize that he was facing a military challenge by all standards, on the one hand he is trying to pass messages to Russia with his seriousness in dismantling the terrorist body in Idlib, bearing in mind that his theory which comes in the framework of escaping from his pledges or eluding them in Idlib and its environs after years of elusiveness, is no longer on deaf ears from Moscow, especially since Erdogan sought through his maneuvers to preserve the terrorist groups he sponsored, trained, armed and employed In various places and times inside and outside Syria.

On the other hand, the Turkish-backed terrorist factions began to escalate against him, which came to the point that the terrorist groups of his supporters engaged in an armed clash with the Turkish army, when they began implementing the terms of the recent Moscow agreement regarding joint patrols with the Russian side, and securing a safety distance to Both sides of each road are up to twelve kilometers to ensure they return to work safely.

The previous scene allows us to see another path of the scene in Idlib, it has become clear that Erdogan has practically lost his ability to invest in the political as well as the military in Idlib, and despite the deployment of his soldiers in Idlib and its environs, this puts it before a real challenge centered on the awareness of terrorist factions, They were nothing but a card invested in Turkey’s political bazaar, whether in Syria or outside it, and therefore the two parties, namely Erdogan and his terrorist tools, were waiting for each other and reached the end of the role-and-job exchange play, and the interests were no longer common between them, but instead became contradictory and one of the two parties must remove the other On his way to ensure the continuation of his interests, in sympathy with Russian displeasure at Erdogan’s “impudence” in evading his past and current pledges with Moscow.

. In the midst of this, and in the context of regional and international balances related to the Syrian file, it seems that Russia has not succeeded, through political understandings, to achieve military success, specifically in the Northern Syria paper, but in return for that, and within the field success equation imposed by the Syrian army, it seems that the paper Idlib, as a pressure card through which to engineer the reality of the conflict in Syria, will be withdrawn from regional and international circulation, and Turkey cannot rely on this paper, because the size of the risks that frame the borders of Russian-Turkish interests will force Erdogan to avoid engaging in the midst of the Idlib file and its parts, the bitter truth Which has become wrapped in a political and military reality imposed by the Syrian state and its army, according to which Erdogan has become between the jaws of pincers, and among the most bitter options, on the one hand the Syrian army is around the corner or below the demolition of the Idlib walls over the heads of Erdogan’s mercenaries, and Turkey knows very well that its terrorist factions are not strong on Confronting the Syrian army, especially since the allies of Damascus are struggling to impose facts and break the challenges in the Idlib file. On the other hand, Erdogan realizes that the chapters of his terrorist play are now in their minds, especially since there are conflicting interests between It was among its terrorist tools, which I realized that it will soon be burned card.

In conclusion, it is clear that Putin is good at tickling Erdogan’s ambitions, and putting them in molds commensurate with the nature of the political and military conditions related to the Syrian issue, as the developments imposed by the Syrian army and its allies in Idlib are enough to put Erdogan into a political coma, so that the Russian revival would be a road map from which Erdogan would not deviate. But there is no harm from time to time in activating the option of military force in order to reach political solutions in Syria, especially since the complexities confirm that the interactions that are intended to delay the Syrian solutions come from Washington and instigated by it, but the Russian strategic ability to contain Erdogan’s concerns, and an example The Syrian state and its army by activating any political and military option that remains guarantor of imposing facts and achievements, leading to the liberation of the Syrian geography from Turkish and American terrorism, according to the Syrian equations.

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