We Do Not Accept Humiliation in Our Sahara : A Cross‑Sovereign Reading in the Context of the UN Shift on the Moroccan Sahara Issue

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• Dr. Abdellah Chanfar

Invoking the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah — an agreement that seemed to the Muslims to be submission and overt injustice — ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb (may God be pleased with him) posed a frank, clear question to Abū Bakr al‑Ṣiddīq:
“Aren’t we upon the truth while our enemy stands upon falsehood? Then why do we concede humiliation in our religion?”
ʿUmar’s query did not challenge prophetic wisdom but voiced a sovereign anxiety — a zeal for meaning, a moral and psychological refusal to compromise the essence of creed, even if temporarily necessitated by strategic foresight and the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) insight.
I borrow this stance in its spirit, not context, and apply it to our primary territorial issue: Why do we tolerate humiliation in our Sahara? Did we not initially bring this dossier to the UN’s Fourth Committee in 1963 to seek the decolonisation of Spanish Sahara? Are not historical documents, tribal allegiances, state presence in the region, and the martyrs’ blood in the Green March all irrefutable evidence of a non‑negotiable right?
So why is the UN debate still trapped in obsolete rhetoric? Why are we repeatedly asked to prove what is already settled in national conscience and political history? Which of the two lies — geography or history? Aren’t we upon the truth while our foes lie in falsehood?
The assertion “We do not accept humiliation in our land” stems not from emotional spontaneity but anchors a steadfast sovereignty principle — rejecting any symbolic or legal subjugation touching national dignity or treating the State as if its sovereignty were in doubt. The land is not a diplomatically negotiable file, nor a matter of political deals or boundary adjustments; it is a question of existence, of historical legacy, and of national consensus that transcends transactional logic.
The Eleven No’s of Morocco on the Sahara Issue: Strategic Clarity and a Sovereign Standard in International Relations
Morocco’s policy on the Sahara issue is founded on the principle of sovereign clarity and strategic firmness — not as rigidity or refusal to settle, but as a firm and rational framework delineating the scope of debate and negotiation. The Sahara is not a temporary diplomatic matter, but an existential and national cause that forms a real litmus test in Morocco’s worldview, in calibrating friendships, and in measuring the effectiveness of partnerships.
This vision is manifested in eleven “no’s” that constitute a firm political creed, articulated by His Majesty King Mohammed VI and reinforced by official diplomatic practice:
1 No to linking the Sahara issue with human rights — a clear refusal to shift the debate from sovereignty to ancillary matters pursued in separate fora, meant to float the conflict and dilute its legal‑political essence.
2 No to circumventing the established UN mechanism — attachment to the Security Council as the sole legitimate political reference, and rejection of internationalization of the issue in biased or illegitimate forums.
3 No to absolving real parties — primarily Algeria; Morocco refuses to consider Algeria neutral, holding it politically and historically accountable for manufacturing, financing, and sustaining the conflict.
4 No to any solution outside Moroccan sovereignty and the autonomy initiative — rejection of any proposal undermining national territorial unity, while affirming that autonomy is a pragmatic, realistic, and flexible framework that does not compromise sovereignty.
5 No to recognition of any separatist entity — absolute refusal to legitimize the artificial “Sahrawi republic,” which lacks any legal, historical, or demographic foundation.
6 No to imposing a referendum as the exclusive or binding mechanism — a complete exclusion of a once‑Security‑Council‑endorsed option since 2004, infeasible technically and politically on the ground.
7 No to legitimizing the status quo in Tindouf — refusal to normalize the humanitarian and rights tragedy exploited politically, and rejection of any opaque UN oversight.
8 No to involving regional organizations without international legitimacy — refusal to revert to the African Union or others as a settlement framework, due to internal bias that compromises neutrality.
9 No to fragmenting national sovereignty over the Southern Provinces — rejection of discriminatory approaches or solutions that treat the Sahara as separate or lacking national status, affirming legal and institutional unity.
10 No to any approach that diminishes Morocco’s sovereignty or circumvents international legitimacy — rejection of ambiguous language or half‑measures aiming to placate all at the expense of Morocco’s unity and historical rights.
11 No to viewing the Sahara as a boundary issue — but rather as an existential issue; a central key is that the Sahara issue isn’t measured in kilometers or latitudes, but by the state’s full political and historical value. As His Majesty King stated:
“The Sahara is a matter for all Moroccans. As I said in a previous address: the Sahara is a question of existence, not of borders. Morocco will remain in its Sahara, and the Sahara in its Morocco, until God’s inheritance of the earth and those on it.”
In all political, economic, and social systems, three primary concerns prevail:
1 A matter of existence — ensuring the presence of state and citizen.
2 A matter of continuity — securing sustainability and avoiding any cause of political, economic, or social disruption.
3 A matter of development, building, and modernization — ensuring progress and prosperity across all fields.
Strategic Conclusion:
These eleven no’s do not express a defensive posture — they embody an offensive and conscious sovereign doctrine that transforms the Sahara into a reference point in the construction of Morocco’s foreign policy. As His Majesty clearly remarked:
“The Sahara file is the lens through which Morocco views the world — a clear and simple standard by which it measures the sincerity of friendships and the effectiveness of partnerships.”
He further added:
“We expect some states — among Morocco’s traditional and emerging partners — that hold ambiguous positions regarding Moroccan Sahara, to clarify their stance and review it in unequivocal terms.”
In this sense, the Moroccan Sahara is no longer merely a negotiation file but a sovereign compass that reshapes Morocco’s international relations and alliances; true partnership begins with recognition of the Kingdom’s full territorial unity.
For decades, regional actors endeavored to frame the conflict as one of colonialism versus self‑determination, exploiting the Cold War and ideological block dynamics to entrench a separatist entity outside the logic of history, geography, and demography.
But what does the principle of self‑determination mean when divorced from empirical reality? Is it acceptable to market separatism under the guise of liberation when the land is under state administration, local institutions are elected, projects are underway, and populations are participating in governance?
Since 2007, Morocco has proposed autonomy not as a concession, but as a realistic political offer that preserves sovereignty while granting extended self‑governance — a proposal unmatched by any better alternative from the opposing side. Can we consequently still accept that Morocco be treated as an occupying power, while the UN itself esteems this initiative as serious and credible?
A precise reading of the evolution of international positions reveals a qualitative shift in the interpretation of the conflict: since 2006, the Security Council has approached the issue on the basis of consensual political resolution, followed from 2018 by the Fourth Committee — the last bastion of rigid legal discourse — to one shifting from “decolonization” to “support for a political process under Security Council auspices.” After all this, is it conceivable to still tolerate stale rhetoric annually recycled in Committee chambers as if nothing has changed?
What we observe today is that Morocco no longer merely defends its position, but now dictates UN discourse — not by withdrawing from the Fourth Committee despite its ostensible neutrality, but by transforming it into a platform to highlight conceptual shifts:
1 From occupation to legitimate sovereignty;
2 From referendum to consensual political solution;
3 From Front to populations;
Is there a greater political victory than compelling a long‑used international institution to articulate one’s narrative rather than merely defending it?
Staying in the Fourth Committee, therefore, is no longer a burden but a symbolic asset — proof that Morocco now controls the interpretation of its own dispute, not merely defends it. Withdrawing the dossier from the Committee, albeit justifiable, might cost Morocco this invaluable platform that has evolved “from a court into a witness.”
Why maintain presence when the adversary has begun to lose its rhetorical and political tools?
The expression “We do not accept humiliation in our Sahara” is not a denial of political initiative, but a reminder that every initiative — however flexible — must originate from the right to sovereignty, not from questioning it. It is a rejection of maneuvering, not of negotiation. A refusal of symbolic fragility, not of political rationality. It epitomizes Morocco’s balance between openness to solutions and firmness on non‑negotiables: dignity and sovereignty.
The question to the international community remains open: if major powers—from Washington to Madrid, from Berlin to The Hague—support the autonomy initiative and regard it as the optimal solution, and if the UN itself has abandoned illusions of a referendum, why maintain stereotypical rhetoric in some of its committees as if time had not moved on? Is it not just that instruments of international law should keep pace with political reality? Or is UN bureaucracy incapable of revising a conceptual legacy that time has outgrown?
Final Summary:
The Sahara is not merely a “file” in the hands of diplomats but a mirror reflecting the voice of the people and the state’s ability to combine realism with principles, sovereignty with openness, strategic firmness with tactical patience. The phrase “We do not accept humiliation in our Sahara” is not a rejection of reason but a refusal to compromise on the uncompromisable. It is an appeal for the world finally to understand that territorial unity is not a matter for negotiation; it is part of the very definition of the Moroccan state.

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