“Secrets”. The Syrian-Turkish rapprochement according to the Russian perspective.
Amjad Ismail Al-Agha
Political writer and researcher.
A clear Russian urgency is reflected in the statements of Kremlin leaders regarding an attempt to create a turning point in the context of restoring Syrian-Turkish relations. What Moscow is trying to engineer and play an effective mediation role in, in order to melt the iceberg between Damascus and Ankara, is determined by current regional and international developments related to the war on Gaza, as well as the developments of the Russian war in Ukraine, and their many repercussions in terms of regional files, in addition to the US presidential elections and the new regional and international policies associated with them. In connection with this, Russia seeks, through its movements on the Syrian-Turkish track, to prevent targeting its role in the region. In the same context, Russia seeks to strengthen its various interests, by taking advantage of the set of regional circumstances, and scoring a point of victory by restoring Syrian-Turkish relations, especially since those relations have been strained to their maximum limits, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis and Turkey’s involvement in it.
The above is a general scene that frames the Russian moves and its attempt to bring about a rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara, which cools the common files between them, and is a basis for long-term understandings. At a later stage, a breakthrough can be made in the titles of the political solution in Syria. However, in depth, the Russian moves aimed at restoring the relations of its ally with Turkey are based in one of their titles on fears of the growing Iranian role in Syria, to the extent that Russian influence and interests are reduced and even marginalized. In return, Russia is also working to form an equation through which Russian, Turkish and Syrian interests are cohesive, and to place the common opponents within the framework of joint work, especially the self-administration in northeastern Syria. On another level, it is building a different approach with the Syrian opposition, in order to manage the contradictions between Damascus and the Syrian opposition, especially since the latter is building a sponsorship relationship with Ankara in Idlib and northwestern Syria. “Assad’s opponents” are a card that Ankara is investing in within the bets of the Syrian reality, and Russia seeks through its mediation to limit the influence of that card regionally and internationally, and to form a new political reality based on it, which will bring about the required turning point between the Turkish president and his counterpart Bashar al-Assad, in addition to the Syrian-Turkish hostility against the Kurdish presence, and considering it an enemy that is dealt with militarily and security-wise. The translation of the Russian role and its efforts can be understood through the statements of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, when he said, “The cessation of the armed conflict between Damascus and the opposition in Syria represents, at the present time, the main achievement of Turkey and Russia.” Fidan continued, “The most important thing that the Russians and we have been able to achieve in Syria is that there is currently no war between the regime and the opposition, and the Astana negotiations and other forms have made this possible at the present time,” adding, “Damascus needs to exploit this period of calm wisely, and it must exploit it as an opportunity to return millions of people who fled abroad and rebuild the country. I stressed this during our meetings with our Russian colleagues in Moscow, and Syria must do this itself, and we are studying this matter. The return of refugees is an important matter.” Russian President Vladimir Putin had a not-so-hidden role in the Syrian crisis, and Russian political and military intervention played a prominent role in limiting the effects of the war on the political system in Syria. After a year of direct Russian intervention in the Syrian war, a ceasefire agreement was reached at the end of 2016 between Damascus and its opponents, paving the way for the start of a negotiation process and a peaceful political solution. Three agreements were launched, the first of which was a ceasefire, the second included monitoring the ceasefire system, and the third included the readiness of the various forces and their response to engage in the negotiation process and political settlement. Since then, the Syrian crisis has entered a complex phase in which regional and international interests have become intertwined, and with the prominent American role in the crisis, and UN Resolution 2254 and its clear effects, a new fact emerged that formed a point of convergence between Syria and Turkey. The autonomous regions in northeastern Syria represent a pressure factor on Turkey, as Ankara sees the autonomous administration’s orientations in this context as a threat to its national security, while Damascus, in contrast, sees separatist desires and an American agenda to divide Syrian geography. Between this and that, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is suffering from a clear political crisis regarding the Kurds, which has resulted in his continued threat to launch a military war on northern Syria. Earlier, what was revealed by the London-based human rights observatory about “a secret meeting between Russian and Turkish soldiers in the city of Tal Abyad, located within the Peace Spring area under the control of Turkish forces and the factions of the Syrian National Army loyal to Ankara, amidst a state of alert and confusion among the factions, and fears of the possibility of handing over the area, by a Russian-Turkish agreement, to the Syrian army with the aim of extending its control over the area, seemed remarkable. The observatory confirmed that while there appear to be implicit agreements between the Russian and Turkish sides in the areas under the latter’s control within the areas of Olive Branch, Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring to restore the Syrian army’s control over those areas and weaken the SDF, Idlib and its countryside are witnessing Turkish military reinforcements on the opposite side of the contact lines with the Syrian forces, in anticipation of a military escalation or potential battles.
In general, since the end of 2022, Moscow has been striving to restore relations between Syria and Turkey as part of its broader strategy to confront NATO in the Ukrainian arena. Russia sees Turkey as a potential ally that can play an important role in To achieve its regional goals, therefore, it is working to inject new blood into Syrian-Turkish relations. As for the future of relations between Russia, Iran and the United States, it must be remembered that Russia has its own calculations and Iran has its own calculations as well. Despite the two parties’ support for Damascus, there is also a conflict of interests.
After the recent statements about the rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus through Russian mediation, Iranian pressure came by revealing a draft agreement with the Syrian government to recover its debts, and accordingly we cannot predict final solutions, at least in the foreseeable near future.
Regardless of the above, Russia seeks to secure its regional influence on the Mediterranean, which it will not be able to achieve in reality unless relations between Ankara and Damascus improve, especially since the most prominent Russian military presence abroad is on the Syrian coast. In this sense, it can be said that if Moscow is able to restore the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement, the Russian position will be stronger in terms of its policy towards America, as it will fortify its presence in the Middle East through its presence in the Hmeimim and Qamishli bases, which gives Moscow a stronger card in influencing the Syrian issue and in resolving the problems of northern Syria.
The Syrian-Turkish rapprochement may occur within the framework of field coordination in principle, and in a manner that meets Russia’s desires, but the most important and framing question for restoring Syrian-Turkish relations remains a reality. It is a question related to the conditions of Damascus and Ankara, and the Iranian factor influencing Damascus.